Introduction
When using the Curry-Howard correspondence in order to obtain executable programs from mathematical proofs, we are faced with a difficult problem : to interpret each axiom of our axiom system for mathematics (which may be, for example, second order classical logic, or classical set theory) as an instruction of our programming language. This problem has been solved for the axiom of excluded middle by T. Griffin [5] , who found that it can be interpreted by means of control instructions like call-with-current-continuation in SCHEME, catch and throw in LISP or try ... with ... in CAML. The solution for the comprehension axiom scheme for second order logic was essentially given by G. Takeuti [14] , who gave a formulation of this scheme by means of an elimination rule of the second order universal quantifier, and J.Y. Girard who showed in [4] that this rule can be interpreted by the identity instruction λx x. In [11] , this problem is solved for the axioms of classical Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, with the axiom of foundation, but without the axiom of choice. Indeed the problem remains for the axiom of choice, which is essential in many proofs. In most cases, we know how to avoid it, but at the price of much longer proofs. The weaker axiom of countable choice is fundamental in calculus, measure theory, . . . (this very important part of mathematics which can be formalized in second order classical logic). It is certainly unavoidable. In this paper, we give an interpretation of the axiom of countable choice (and even the slightly stronger axiom of dependent choice) in classical second order logic, as a programming instruction. Using the results of [11] , the same method applies indeed in ZF set theory. Our solution is to introduce a new instruction in λ-calculus, which uses an enumeration of λ-terms. We give two different computational interpretations and in fact implementations, for this instruction : the first is similar to the quote instruction of LISP and the second is given in terms of a clock. Such an instruction is rather difficult to handle, because it is incompatible with β-reduction. Therefore, we must set very precisely our framework in order to be able to give it a type. This is done in the next section ; we use essentially the same framework as in [11] . Then we give the interpretation of the axioms of countable and dependent choice in terms of the new instruction. In the last section, we apply this method to first order arithmetical formulas which are provable in classical analysis with choice, in the spirit of the nocounter-example interpretation of G. Kreisel. We use the ideas about game semantics for proofs of such formulas which have been developed in [3] . Other computational interpretations of the countable axiom of choice have been given in [1] , and recently in [2] . It would be interesting to understand the relation with the present paper. I want to thank Thierry Coquand and the referee for their very pertinent observations ; and Vincent Danos for an uncountable number of helpful and stimulating discussions. We now define our programming langage : the λ c -calculus, an extension of the λ-calculus with a control instruction and continuations, which is suitable for classical logic.
The λ c -calculus
We have countably many λ-variables x, y, . . . and stack constants π 0 , π 1 , . . ., and we define recursively and simultaneously the set Λ c of λ c -terms and the set Π of stacks. A stack is a finite sequence t 1 . . . t n .ρ of closed λ c -terms t 1 , . . . , t n , ended with a stack constant ρ which is called the bottom of the stack. The λ c -term t 1 is called the top of the stack, n is its length. The λ c -terms are built according to the following rules :
1) A λ-variable is a λ c -term.
2) If t, u are λ c -terms (t)u (also denoted by tu) is a λ c -term.
3) If t is a λ c -term and x a λ-variable, λx t is a λ c -term.
4) The constant cc is a (closed) λ c -term. 5) Each stack π gives, in an injective way, a λ-constant denoted by k π , which is a (closed) λ c -term. It is called the continuation associated with π. The set of closed λ c -terms will be denoted by Λ 0 c . Given a stack π = t 1 . . . t n .ρ and a closed λ c -term t, we denote by t.π the stack t.t 1 . . . t n .ρ obtained by pushing t on the top of π. Given the λ c -terms t, u 1 , . . . , u n , we denote by (t)u 1 . . . u n or even by tu 1 . . . u n the λ c -term (. . . ((t)u 1 )u 2 . . .)u n , obtained by giving to t the arguments u 1 , . . . , u n .
Execution of processes
Λ 0 c ×Π is called the set of processes. Thus, a process is a pair, denoted by t ? π, where t is a closed λ c -term and π is a stack ; t is called the head of the process. A process can be performed, a λ c -term alone cannot. At each time, the head is the active part of the process, i.e. the part which is executed. Thus, there are four rules of execution, because the head of the process may have one of the forms (2), (3), (4) or (5) . The rules are the following, with π, π 0 ∈ Π and t, u ∈ Λ 0 c :
Remark. For example, when t is an ordinary closed λ-term and π is a stack constant, then the reduction of the process t ? π is essentially the weak head reduction of t. Now, let ⊥ ⊥ be a fixed cc-saturated set of processes, i.e. with the property :
A truth value is a subset of Λ 0 c of the form P ⊥ for any P ⊂ Π, where :
c ; (∀π ∈ P) t ? π ∈ ⊥ ⊥}. The set of truth values is denoted by < ⊥ ⊥ or simply < if there is no ambiguity. The truth value of a formula, defined below, will be the set of λ c -terms which realize this formula.
Typing in classical second order logic
Types are usual formulas of second order logic, written with the only logical symbols →, ∀ and some fixed function symbols on individuals, taken in a set L (the language). First order (also called individual) variables are denoted by lower case letters x, y, . . . and second order (also called predicate) variables by upper case letters X, Y, . . . Each second order variable has an arity in N. Variables of arity 0 are also called propositional variables.
(Y is a propositional variable, X has an arbitrary arity). x = y as ∀X(Xx → Xy). We shall use the notation 
Y is a predicate variable 6 = X (as usual, y and Y are assumed not to be free in F ). If F is atomic of the form R(x 1 , . . . , x k ), where R is either a k-ary second order variable or a parameter (R ∈ P(Π)
The deduction rules for classical second order logic are given below, together with the typing rules for λ c -terms ; in an expression like ' t : A ', t is a λ c -term and A a type, that is a second order formula. Let Γ denote x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n (a context). 
Models and realizability
A model M is a set M of individuals (the domain of variation of first order variables), together with an interpretation f M :
It is also given a set ⊥ ⊥ of processes, which is cc-saturated. The domain of variation of k-ary second order variables is P(Π) M k (Π is the set of stacks). Let A be a closed second order formula with parameters in M (first order parameters) and in P(Π) M k (second order k-ary parameters). Its truth value, defined below, is denoted by |A|. Indeed, we have |A| = kAk ⊥ for a certain set of stacks kAk (intuitively, kAk is an interpretation of the negation of A). Now, what we must really define is kAk, which is done by induction on A :
If A is atomic, i.e. R(t 1 , . . . , t k ), then t 1 , . . . , t k are closed terms with parameters in M and R ∈ P(Π) M k is a second order k-ary parameter. Let a i ∈ M be the value of t i ; then we set kR(t 1 , . . . ,
The other steps of the induction are :
We have k⊥k = Π, and thus |⊥| is the least truth value. There is a greatest truth value, denoted by > which is ∅ ⊥ = Λ 0 c (the set of all closed λ c -terms). We can consider > as a propositional constant with k>k = ∅.
Notice that, if ⊥ ⊥ = ∅, the set of truth values is < = {∅, Λ 0 c } = {⊥, >} and we have the ordinary notion of model. We say that t realizes A (notation : t k− A) if t ∈ |A| i.e. (∀π ∈ kAk) t ? π ∈ ⊥ ⊥. The next theorem says that realizability is compatible with classical deduction. It will be used repeatedly in the following.
Theorem 1 (Adequation lemma). Let A 1 ,. . . , A k , A be closed formulas such that
A is obtained with the above rules of deduction. If
In particular, if A is a closed formula and if we can deduce`t : A, then t k− A. We state as a lemma a somewhat stronger and more complicated form of this theorem, which is suitable for an inductive proof.
Lemma 2.
Let A 1 , . . . , A k , A be formulas, the free variables of which are among
Suppose that x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x k : A k`t : A is obtained with the above rules of deduction.
We prove this lemma by induction on the length of the derivation of Γ`t : A (Γ being the context
We consider the last rule used (the case of rule 1 is trivial) : If it is rule 2, we have t = uv and Γ`u : A → B, v : A. We want to show that
π and the result follows since, by the induction hypothesis, we have u
If it is rule 3, we have t = λx u, A = B → C and Γ, x : B`u : C. We want to show
If it is rule 4, we have t = (cc)u and Γ`u : (A → B) → A. We want to show that
If it is rule 5 with a first order variable x, we have A = ∀x B and Γ`t : B. By the induction hypothesis, we have t
If it is rule 5 with a second order variable X of arity p, we have A = ∀X B and Γ`t : B.
By the induction hypothesis, we have t
If it is rule 6, we have A = B[τ /x] and Γ`t : ∀x B. By the induction hypothesis, we get
If it is rule 7, we have
We have Γ`t : ∀X B and we must show that t 0 ∈ |A 0 |. By the induction hypothesis, we know that t 0 ∈ |∀X B 0 | and the result follows from lemma 3.
q.e.d.
Lemma 3. Let Φ (resp. A) be a formula with parameters with the only free variables z 1 , . . . , z p (resp. X of arity p). Define R ∈ P(Π) M p by :
with Y of arity q and Y 6 = X, then :
Second order arithmetic
From now on, the set of individuals is N and we suppose that, for each recursive function φ : N k → N, there is a k-ary function symbol f φ in the language L, which is, of course, interpreted by φ in the model. We shall write φ instead of f φ , which will cause no problem. There is no other function symbol and therefore, the model is completely defined as soon as we have chosen the set ⊥ ⊥. Let F be a closed formula. We say that F is realized if there is a proof-like λ c -term t such that t k− F for every choice of ⊥ ⊥. By theorem 1 : The set of realized formulas is closed under deduction in classical second order logic.
are terms of L, which is true in N, is realized by the λ-term I = λx x.
i) Trivial, by definition of the formula a = b which is ∀X(Xa → Xb).
ii) Easy consequence of (i). q.e.d. The axioms of second order Peano arithmetic (denoted by PA 2 ) can be given in the following way in L, with a constant symbol 0, two unary function symbols s (the successor function) and p (the predecessor function), and two binary symbols +, * : 1. s0 6 = 0 ; p0 = 0 ; ∀x(psx = x) ; ∀x(x + 0 = x) ; ∀x(x * 0 = 0) ; ∀x∀y(x + sy) = s(x + y) ; ∀x∀y(x * sy) = x * y + x ; 2. ∀x Int[x] where Int[x] ≡ ∀X{∀y(Xy → Xsy), X0 → Xx}. Formula 2 is the axiom of recurrence ; Int[x] reads as " x is an integer ". It is easy to check that axioms 1 are realized ; indeed : by theorem 4(i) we get |s0 6 = 0| = |(> → ⊥) → ⊥| and therefore λx(x)t k− s0 6 = 0 for any t ∈ Λ 0 c . Other axioms 1 are equational formulas, and are realized by I, by theorem 4(ii). Strangely enough, axiom 2 is not realized in general : indeed, it is generally impossible to find a proof-like λ c -term which realizes simultaneously Int[0] and Int[s0], not to speak of ∀x Int [x] . Moreover, in most interesting models, the negation of axiom 2 is realized by a proof-like λ c -term. But our aim is, given a theorem Θ of PA 2 , i.e. a consequence of axioms 1 and 2, to find properties of any λ c -term t built with a proof of Θ. In order to use realizability, we want to get rid of the axiom of recurrence. This can be done by the following well known property : Any proof of Θ in second order classical logic, using axioms 1 and 2, and any set E of equational formulas of L true in N, can be transformed into a proof of Θ Int using axioms 1, E and the following :
Int is the formula obtained by restricting to Int all first order quantifiers of Θ. It is inductively defined as follows :
Therefore, it now remains to prove the following :
Theorem 5. Let f be a k-ary function symbol of L (i.e. representing a recursive function). Then the formula ∀x 1 . . .
We first need a result about usual λ-calculus. We will use the following : Notations. Λ is the set of usual λ-terms. If t, u ∈ Λ, then t ' β t 0 means that t is β-equivalent to t 0 ; t Â t 0 means that t reduces to t 0 by weak head reduction : one step of weak head reduction is (λx u)vv 1 
The following lemma explains why we use the same symbol Â for weak head reduction of ordinary λ-terms and execution of processes.
Lemma 6.
Let ξ, η, t 1 , . . . , t k ∈ Λ be closed ordinary λ-terms and π ∈ Π. If η is not an application (i.e. η is a λ-constant or η = λx η 0 ) and if
The proof is by induction on the length of the weak head reduction ξ Â (η)t 1 . . .
. . v n and, by induction hypothesis :
π. Now, the first n − 1 steps of reduction from the left-hand side concern some application ; since η is not an application, we have not yet reached the right-hand side after these steps. Therefore, we have :
Notations.
For t, u ∈ Λ c we define :
n u for n ∈ N by : (t) 0 u = u, (t) n+1 u = (t)(t) n u. t•u by λx(t)(u)x, where x does not appear in t, u.
Lemma 7. Let f, a be λ-constants and ξ ∈ Λ such that ξ ' β (f ) n a. Suppose that φ k− ∀y(Xy → Xsy) and α k− X0. Then ξ[φ/f, α/a] k− Xs n 0.
Proof by induction on n. If n = 0, then ξ ' β a and therefore ξ Â a. If π ∈ kX0k, then ξ ? π Â a ? π by lemma 6. Therefore ξ[φ/f, α/a] ? π Â α ? π ∈ ⊥ ⊥. If n > 0, then ξ Â (f )η with η ' β (f ) n−1 a. Let π ∈ kXs n 0k ; then ξ ? π Â f ? η.π by lemma 6 and ξ[φ/f, α/a] ? π Â φ ? η[φ/f, α/a].π. Now, φ ∈ |Xs n−1 0 → Xs n 0| and, by induction hypothesis, η[φ/f, α/a] ∈ |Xs n−1 0|. Therefore φ ? η[φ/f, α/a].π ∈ ⊥ ⊥. q.e.d.
Let φ k− ∀y(Xy → Xsy), α k− X0 and π ∈ kXs n 0k ; we must show that ν ? φ.α.π ∈ ⊥ ⊥. Since ν ' β λf λx(f ) n x, we have ν Â λf η, η Â λa ξ and ξ ' β (f ) n a. By lemma 6, we have ν ? φ.α.π Â λf η ? φ.α.π Â η[φ/f ] ? α.π. Again by lemma 6, we have :
But, by lemma 7, we have ξ[φ/f, α/a] ∈ |Xs n 0| and thus
Theorem 9.
Let T = (λf λn(n)λg g•s)f 0, where s is a λ-term for the successor (e.g.
Remark. T is called a storage operator (cf. [10] ). We can understand intuitively what it does by comparing the weak head reductions of φν and T φν, where φ and ν are ordinary λ-terms, ν ' β λf λx(f ) n x (a Church integer). Then T φν Â (φ)(s) n 0, which means that the computation of the integer argument ν of φ takes place first. In other words, T emulates call-by-value inside weak head reduction, which is a call-by-name reduction. Notice that we use the same symbol s for a λ-term and a function symbol in L. proof. Let ν k− Int[s n 0] and π ∈ kXk ; we have to show that T φ ? ν.π ∈ ⊥ ⊥. We define a unary second order parameter P by : kP (j)k = {s n−j 0.π} for 0 ≤ j ≤ n and kP (j)k = ∅ for j > n. We have φ k− P 0 by hypothesis on φ. We show that λg g•s k− ∀x(P x → P sx), which means that λg g•s ∈ |P (j) → P (j + 1)| for all j ∈ N. This is trivial for j ≥ n. If j < n, let ξ ∈ |P (j)| ; we must show λg g•s ? ξ.s n−j−1 0.π ∈ ⊥ ⊥. But we have : λg g•s ? ξ.s n−j−1 0.π Â ξ•s ? s n−j−1 0.π Â ξ ? s n−j 0.π ∈ ⊥ ⊥ by hypothesis on ξ. Now, we get T φ ? ν.π Â ν ? λg g•s.φ.0.π which is in ⊥ ⊥ because : ν k− ∀x(P x → P sx), P 0 → P s n 0 by hypothesis, φ k− P 0 and 0.π ∈ kP s n 0k. q.e.d. We can now prove theorem 5. For simplicity, we suppose k = 1, so that we have a recursive function f : N → N. Let φ ∈ Λ be a λ-term which represents f : for n ∈ N, we have φs n 0 ' β λf λx(f ) p x with p = f (n). Therefore φs n 0 Â λf ξ and, by theorem 8, we
we have λf ξ ? π ∈ ⊥ ⊥. Now, by lemma 6, we have φs n 0 ? π Â λf ξ ? π ; but this reduction has necessarily at least one step, because φs n 0 6 = λf ξ (φs n 0 does not begin by λ). Therefore φ ? s n 0.π Â λf ξ ? π ∈ ⊥ ⊥. Since this is true for every π ∈ kInt[s p 0]k, it follows from theorem 9 that
Since this is true for each n ∈ N, we get :
The countable axiom of choice
The axioms of classical analysis are : second order arithmetic and the axiom of countable choice. Thus, in order to get programs from proofs in classical analysis, it remains the problem : is it possible to realize this axiom ? This section is devoted to a positive answer to this problem. The countable axiom of choice is the following axiom scheme :
. F is a second order formula in which the 2-ary variable Z does not appear ; X is of arity 1 ;Ỹ = (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) is a finite sequence of second order variables (which are, in fact, parameters). We will rather write this axiom scheme in the contrapositive form :
. This means that Z(x, y) is some counterexample to ∀X F [x, X], whenever any exists. In order to realize this scheme, we introduce in the λ c -calculus a new constant denoted by χ. We consider a fixed bijection n 7 → t n of N onto Λ 0 c (we do not even need that this bijection be recursive) ; let φ 7 → n φ be the inverse function. For every n ∈ N, we denote by n a fixed λ-term which is ' β λf λx(f ) n x, for example λf λx(f ) n x itself, or s n 0, where s is a λ-term for the successor. We extend the rules of execution of processes by giving the following rule for χ : χ ? φ.π Â φ ? n φ .π for every φ ∈ Λ 0 c and π ∈ Π. Remark. We shall give below our intuitive interpretations of such a reduction rule. From now on, of course, when we consider a set ⊥ ⊥ of processes, it will be cc-saturated for the extended notion of reduction.
Theorem 10.
Let F [x, X] be a formula with parameters (X being unary). There exists Φ :
For each n ∈ N, define P n (⊥ ⊥) = {π ∈ Π; t n ? n.π / ∈ ⊥ ⊥}. Now, for every individual x, we have k∀X
By the axiom of countable choice, we get a function Φ : N 3 → P(Π) which has the following property : if
Now, let x be fixed (in N, which is the set of individuals) and consider π ∈ k∀X F [x, X]k and φ ∈ |∀n(Int[n] → F [x, Φ(x, n, y)/Xy])|. We must show that χ ? φ.π ∈ ⊥ ⊥ and, by the rule for χ, it is sufficient to show φ ? n φ .π ∈ ⊥ ⊥. If it is not true, we put n = n φ , so that t n = φ and we have π
, we get t n ? n.π 0 / ∈ ⊥ ⊥. But, since π 0 ∈ kF [x, Φ(x, n, y)/Xy]k, by the hypothesis on φ, we have φ ? n.π 0 ∈ ⊥ ⊥, because n k− Int[s n 0] (theorem 8). This is a contradiction, because φ = t n . q.e.d. From this theorem, we can get a λ c -term with χ which realizes the axiom of countable choice as follows :
Lemma 11. There is a λ c -term Ω such that :
Remember that ∃Z{A, B} is a notation for ∀X{∀Z(A, B → X) → X}. It is equivalent to ∃Z(A ∧ B).
proof. The lemma is trivial, because this formula is clearly provable in classical second order logic : take simply for Z(x, n) the formula which says that n is the first integer such that ¬Y (x, n) if there exists one ; i.e. Z(x, n) is :
q.e.d. Now, by theorem 10, we know that :
Take for Y (x, n) in lemma 11, the formula F [x, Φ(x, n, y)/Xy]. We get :
])} for any formula F . Therefore, if we define the axiom scheme (CCA) as :
we obtain : (*) Θ k− (CCA) for every formula F . with Θ = λz(z)λx(Ω)λy(x)λaλb(χ)(y)ab The axiom scheme (CCA) is trivially equivalent to (CAC) and is realized by a λ c -term which is independent of F . However, in order to derive (CAC) from (CCA), we need the " theorem scheme of extensionality " :
}. This theorem scheme is proved by (concrete) induction on F and therefore the associated λ c -term will eventually depend on F . Now, we can add to our deduction rules 1, . . . , 7 the following one : 8.`Θ : ∃U ∃Z{Func(Z), ∀x(∀n(Z(x, n) → F [x, U (x, n, y)/Xy]) → ∀X F [x, X])} Rules 1 to 8 form a deduction system for " classical analysis ", i.e. classical second order logic with countable choice. It follows from (*) that the adequation lemma (theorem 1) remains valid for these deduction rules.
Dependent choice
In this section, we show, by the same method, that the axiom scheme of dependent choice can be realized. This axiom scheme is :
} for any formula H in which the variable Z does not appear. Let <x, y> be a binary function symbol, which represents a bijection from N 2 onto N. We assume it to be recursive, so that theorem 5 applies.
Theorem 12. Let F [X, Y ] be a formula with parameters (X, Y being unary). For every X 0 : N → P(Π), there exists A :
We first prove :
The proof is the same as theorem 10. Let P n (⊥ ⊥) = {π ∈ Π; t n ? n.π / ∈ ⊥ ⊥} and define V : N 2 → P(Π) by the following condition : if
If it is not true, we put n = n φ , so that t n = φ and we have :
, we have t n ? n.π 0 / ∈ ⊥ ⊥. But π 0 ∈ kF [U(x, y)/Xy, V (<n, x>, y)/Y y]k and thus, by hypothesis on φ, we get φ ? n.π 0 ∈ ⊥ ⊥. This is a contradiction because φ = t n . q.e.d. By lemma 13, we have (∀U ∈ P(Π)
Therefore, we obtain theorem 12 by means of an application of the axiom of dependent choice to the formula Φ(U, V ).
q.e.d. Now, by theorem 12, the following formula is realized by λx(x)IIχ (with I = λx x) :
}. Therefore, in order to realize the axiom of dependent choice, it is sufficient to derive this axiom from formula ( * ), where F is ¬H, in classical second order logic. The derivation is as follows : define inductively the sequence n k of integers by the conditions n 0 = 0 and n k+1 = <n, n k > for the first integer n such that H[A(k, n k , y)/Xy, A(k +1, <n, n k >, y)/Y y]. The formula ( * ) and the hypothesis ∀X∃Y H(X, Y ) ensure that such an integer always exists. Finally, if we define Z(k, y) by A(k, n k , y), we get : 
Variant and interpretations
We can get the same results by using, instead of χ, a dual instruction χ which works on stacks instead of terms. Consider now a bijection n 7 → π n of N onto Π, and let π 7 → n π be the inverse function. We introduce into the λ c -calculus a new constant denoted by χ and we extend the rules of execution of processes by giving the following rule for χ : χ ? φ.π Â φ ? n π .π for every φ ∈ Λ 0 c and π ∈ Π. We have the analogue of theorem 10 and the proof is even simpler : Theorem 14. Let F [x, X] be a formula with parameters (X being unary). There exists Φ :
For every individual x and every stack π, we have :
Therefore, by the axiom of countable choice, there exists a function Φ :
We must show that χ ? φ.π ∈ ⊥ ⊥ and, by the rule for χ, it is sufficient to show φ ? n π .π ∈ ⊥ ⊥. But this is clear because : -by hypothesis on φ, we have φ k− Int(s n π 0) → F [x, Φ(x, n π , y)/Xy] ; -by theorem 8, we have n π k− Int(s n π 0) ; -and by hypothesis on π and the definition of Φ, we have π ∈ kF [x, Φ(x, n π , y)/Xy]k.
q.e.d. We get in the same way an analogue of lemma 13. Now, by exactly the same reasoning as above, we realize the axioms of countable choice and of dependent choice, using χ instead of χ.
The 'quote' interpretation
The rule of reduction for the instruction χ is : χ ? φ.π Â φ ? n φ .π. This rule makes χ very similar to the quote instruction of LISP. Indeed n φ may be used in the same way as (quote φ), if we assume that φ 7 → n φ is a recursive bijection from Λ 0 c onto N. For example, since n u is then a recursive function of n tu , we can define, using χ, an instruction χ 0 such that χ 0 ? φ.ψ.π Â φ ? n ψ .π : let p be a closed λ-term such that (p)n tu ' β n u and let χ 0 = λxλy(χ)(λd x•p)y. As we can see in this example, the instruction χ is not compatible with β-reduction : indeed, we cannot replace (λd x•p)y with x•p. As observed by the referee, in the program associated with the axiom of countable choice, the instruction χ is not used in the same way as the 'quote' instruction is habitually used in LISP. In fact, the only operation which is performed on the integers n φ is to compare them, and φ is never retrieved from n φ . In other words, there is no use of the 'unquote' or 'eval' instruction which, in LISP, is the inseparable companion of 'quote'. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the instruction χ can be implemented by means of the 'quote' instruction. Moreover, it is quite possible that, in future work, trying to interpret some other axioms or theorems, someone will use the program 'eval' in interaction with χ.
The clock interpretation
We give now another interpretation for the instruction χ (which is also valid for χ). We observe that the application n 7 → t n may be any surjective map from N onto Λ 0 c . The reduction rule for χ is then :
χ ? φ.π Â φ ? n.π. where n is any integer such that t n = φ. This suggests the following interpretation : χ is an input instruction and, when it comes in head position, the process χ ? φ.π waits for some integer n which is provided by some human operator or some external process. Then we have the reduction χ ? φ.π Â φ ? n.π and the execution goes on. The only constraint is that " φ must be retrievable from n ", i.e. the integers provided to the processes χ ? φ.π and χ ? φ 0 .π 0 with φ 6 = φ 0 , must be different. A very simple and natural way to obtain this behaviour is to provide the integer n by means of a clock, since two different λ c -terms cannot appear at the same time. In other words, we may suppose there is a second process running aside the main one, which simply increments an integer at each step of reduction. This process provides the integer n when needed, that is when χ comes in head position in the main process. This method gives a completely different way of implementing the instruction χ. I think that the behaviour of the program associated with the axioms of countable or dependent choice is easier to understand with this implementation.
Arithmetical theorems
In this section, we apply the above results to study the behaviour of programs associated with proofs of arithmetical theorems in PA 2 + CAC. As an example, we consider first a Σ 0 2 formula Φ of the form ∃x∀y[φ(x, y) = 0] where φ is a recursive function. Consider the following game between two players named ∃ and ∀ : ∃ plays an integer m, ∀ reply with an integer n ; the game stops at the first moment when φ(m, n) = 0 and then ∃ wins ; thus, ∀ wins if and only if the game lasts infinitely long. The following is trivial : ∃ has a winning strategy if and only if N |= Φ ; moreover, in this case, there is an obvious winning strategy for ∃ : to play successively 0, 1, 2, . . . We will show (theorem 15) that the program associated with a proof of Φ in PA 2 + CAC acts as a winning strategy for the above game. We first get rid of the axiom of recurrence as explained above and thus, we consider a proof in " classical analysis " of the formula :
. Now we add the following constants to λ c -calculus : κ np (n, p ∈ N) and κ which is an input instruction. Thus the λ c -terms become interactive programs. Once again, we extend the rules of execution of processes by giving the following rule for κ :
s is is a fixed λ-term for the successor in Church integers. This rule is non-deterministic, since the integer p and the stack π 0 are arbitrary.
does not even depend on Φ, but only on the number k of quantifiers :
The player ∃ uses an effective enumeration of N k . When he comes to the k-uple n 1 . . . n k , he chooses the longest already reached position of the form n 1 p 1 . . . n i p i . We know that i < k because this position was reached for a k-uple of integers different from n 1 . . . n k . Then he successively plays n i+1 , . . . , n k regardless of the choices of ∀. Then he takes the next k-uple of integers. If this play is infinite, we get k functions f i (x 1 , . . . , x i ) such that :
N |= ∀x 1 . . . ∀x k {φ[x 1 , f 1 (x 1 ), x 2 , f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ), . . . , x k , f k (x 1 , . . . , x k )] 6 = 0} which is the Skolem form of ¬Φ ; thus N |= ¬Φ. Conversely, if N |= ¬Φ, there exists k functions f i (x 1 , . . . , x i ) such that the Skolem form of ¬Φ is satisfied. Of course, they provide a winning strategy to the opponent ∀. Let us now introduce into the λ c -calculus the constants κ n 1 p 1 ... For i = k no reduction is possible.
It is a non-deterministic rule, since p i+1 and π 0 are arbitrary.
The intuitive meaning of these rules is the following : in the left-hand side, the program, which stands for the player ∃, chooses the previously reached position n 1 p 1 . . . n i p i and proposes the integer n i+1 ; then, in the right-hand side, the opponent ∀ replies with p i+1 and the execution goes on ; κ n 1 p 1 ...n i+1 p i+1 keeps a trace of the fact that the position n 1 p 1 . . . n i+1 p i+1 has been reached. Remark. κ is the constant associated with the empty position of the game. The meaning of the theorem is that each proof of Φ Int in classical second order logic with axiom of choice gives an interactive program, which wins against every strategy of the opponent, in the game associated with the formula :
Φ ≡ ∃x 1 ∀y 1 . . . ∃x k ∀y k (φ(x 1 , y 1 , . . . , x k , y k ) = 0). This theorem is closely related to the no-counter-example interpretation of G. Kreisel [7, 8] (see also [3, 6, 13] ) : Kreisel has shown that, if Φ is a theorem of first order Peano arithmetic, then there exists type recursive functionals in the sense of [13] ξ 2 ) , . . . , ξ k , f k (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ k )] = 0 with ξ i = F i (f 1 , . . . , f k ) for any functions f i : N i → N (1 ≤ i ≤ k), i.e. for any strategy of the opponent. Theorem 16 associates such a functional to each proof of Φ in classical analysis (with axiom of choice) and gives it as an explicit program which is a winning strategy for the player ∃. proof. We define ⊥ ⊥ as the set of processes all reductions of which end up into κ n 1 p 1 ...n k p k ? π 0
